DAY THREE |
October 18, 1962 |
Kennedy's hesitation to support the blockade, despite pressures from his advisers, demonstrates his mindful approach to leadership. He knew an air strike would prompt retaliation, so he tried to find a more peaceful solution to preserve the well-being of his citizens and uphold the morality of his country.
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"President Kennedy is visited by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who asserts that Soviet aid to Cuba is purely defensive and does not represent a threat to the United States. Kennedy, without revealing what he knows of the existence of the missiles, reads to Gromyko his public warning of September 4 that the "gravest consequences" would follow if significant Soviet offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba" (JFK Library).
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"Minutes of the John F. Kennedy and Gromyko meeting" (U.S. Department of State).
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"Minutes of the John F. Kennedy and Gromyko meeting":
“Mr. Gromyko said he was sure the President was familiar with the Soviet Government’s and Mr. Khrushchev’s views on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests … The question was why should the Soviet Union formulate its policy with respect to nuclear tests on the basis of what was convenient to the United States... The US was seeking ways and means of continuing the build-up of nuclear weapons... Since the US did not wish to come to an agreement and did not wish to end all tests, the Soviet Union would have to draw the necessary conclusions with respect to its security" |
“The ExComm convenes for further discussions. The JCS, attending part of the meeting, recommends that President Kennedy order an airstrike on the missiles and other key Cuban military installations. However, Robert Kennedy responds by asking whether a surprise attack would be morally acceptable course of action. According to Robert Kennedy, the ExComm spent “more time [deliberating] on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter” (Chang and Kornbluh).
"Joint Evaluation on the Soviet Missile Threat":
“Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch.” |
"Joint Evaluation on the Soviet Missile Threat" (US Department of State).
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"Meeting at the White House the ExComm presents its recommendations to President Kennedy. By this time most members of the committee support the blockade option. As the meeting progresses, however, individual opinions begin to shift and the consensus behind the blockade breaks down. Kennedy directs the group to continue its deliberations" (Chang and Kornbluh).
"The strongest argument against an all–out military attack, and one no one could answer to [President Kennedy's] satisfaction, was that a surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral position of United States throughout the world" |
TELEGRAM FROM POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON (DROZNIAK TO MILNIKIEL): "Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US" (Wilson Center).
[US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk focused on [discussing] the history of Soviet-American relations over the past years…They [the United States] are not going to cause bloodshed in Cuba. Undertaking a [military] invasion against Cuba, without an open act of aggression on the Cuban side, would mean that the United States could find itself isolated among its allies.