DAY FOUR |
October 19, 1962 |
"As president campaigns for mid-term elections, the CIA pinpoints the locations of three MRBM sites" (Clouds Over Cuba).
"As the 11 Am ExComm meeting progresses, it becomes apparent that sharp disagreements about how the United States should proceed still exist. In order to provide clear options to President Kennedy, the ExComm decides that independent working groups should be established. Separate groups are to develop the blockade and airstrike options, drafting speeches for each plan and outlining possible contingencies” (Chang and Kornbluh).
"SNIE 11-18-62: Soviet Reactions to Certain US courses of Action" (US Department of State).
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"SNIE 11-18-62: Soviet Reaction to Certain U.S. Courses of Action in Cuba":
“A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere.” |
Later that day, “Discussions continue in the ExComm. The papers are critiqued. In the course of this process, airstrike proponents begin to shift their support to the blockade option. The airstrike speech is abandoned, and Theodore Sorensen agrees to try to put together a speech for President Kennedy on the blockade” (Chang and Kornbluh).
TELEGRAM FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER A.A. GROMYKO TO THE CC CPSU: "Gromyko expresses satisfaction at the current American policy of economic embargo toward Cuba and the administration’s current preoccupation in West Berlin" (Wilson Center).
"There is reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention in Cuba and has put its money on obstructing Cuba's economic relations with the USSR and other countries, so as to destroy its economy and to cause hunger in the country, and in this way creating dissatisfaction among the population and prompting an uprising against the regime. This is based on a belief that the Soviet Union will not over a long period be able to provide Cuba with everything it needs...Even the rumor to the effect that the Soviet Union has made it known that it can soften its position on the Cuban issue if the West will soften its own position in West Berlin was basically intended to mollify the public about Cuba."